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We are a University of London group aimed at fostering intercollegiate research in LEMMings studies - Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Mind. We host both talks and read-ahead discussions where postgraduate students, postdoctoral researchers, and faculty can share their work.

Our meetings take place in Senate House and are open to any current graduate/postgraduate students, postdoctoral students, and faculty members from London and beyond.

Upcoming Talks

Colin Chamberlain (UCL)

January 23, 2023 - 4-5:30pm, Senate House Room 234

Title: The Duchess of Disunity: Margaret Cavendish on the Materiality of the Mind

 

Abstract: Sometimes we feel love and hate towards the same thing at the same time. Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673)—the maverick early modern materialist—appeals to this kind of psychic conflict to argue that the mind has parts and, therefore, is material. This paper reconstructs her argument and shows that it is at least somewhat defensible. More specifically, I argue that Cavendish can defend her argument against three objections. The first objection is that passions like love and hate are not rational and so do not belong to the mind. The second is that love and hate are not genuine contraries. The third objection is that Cavendish equivocates on the relevant notion of part. Finally, this paper explains how Cavendish can account for the mind’s unity once she has divided it into parts.

Julian Bacharach (Antwerp)

February 6, 2023 - 4-5:30pm, Senate House Room 243 (room change)

Title: TBA

 

Abstract: TBA

Guilia Lorenzi (Warwick)

February 27, 2023 - 4-5:30pm, Senate House Room 243

Title: TBA

 

Abstract: TBA

Federico Bongiorno (Oxford)

March 13, 2023 - 4-5:30pm, Senate House Room 243

Title: TBA

 

Abstract: TBA

Our Past Events

David Sosa (Texas)

December 12, 2022 - 4-5:30pm, Senate House Room 234

Title: Phenomenal Failure to Discriminate 

Abstract: If one thing looks the same as a second (in a given respect), and that second thing looks the same as a third, does the first look the same as the third? It is easy to suppose that it need not: but I will defend the position that they do. The crucial distinction is between the relations of indiscriminability (which does not validate transitivity) and of looking the same as (which, I suggest, does).

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Location

Senate House, University of London, Malet St, Bloomsbury, London WC1E 7HU, UK

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