We are a University of London group aimed at fostering intercollegiate research in the Philosophy of Mind. We host talks and read-ahead discussions where postgraduate students, postdoctoral researchers, and faculty can share their work.


Upcoming Talks


Daniel Vanello (Dublin)

9 March 2020: 4-6pm in Senate House 234

'Partiality, Moral Individuality and the Irreplaceability of the Individual'

The paper begins with the assumption that moral individuality is a centre piece of our moral thinking. But what constitutes moral individuality? My aim in this paper is to make progress in answering this question. I do so by assessing how far we can take Bernard Williams’ criticism of Kantian-inspired, characterless conceptions of moral individuality.

Jonathan Mitchell (Manchester)

23 March 2020: 4-6pm in Senate House 234

‘The Phenomenology of Self Awareness’

4 May 2020: 4-6pm in Senate House 234


Mike Martin (Oxford/Berkeley)

25 May 2020: 4-6pm in Senate House 234


David Jenkins (Tel Aviv)

8 June 2020: 2-4pm in Senate House 234


22 June 2020: 4-6pm in Senate House 234


29 June 2020: 4-6pm in Senate House 234


Our Past Events


James Openshaw (Edinburgh)

9 December 2019: 4-6pm in Senate House 234

For any ordinary object, what must one do, at a general level, in order to acquire the capacity for singular thought about it? In particular, what are the necessary conditions on singular thought which do the aboutness-fixing work—whose fulfilment determines that one’s thought is about that thing? Imogen Dickie’s Fixing Reference (2015) pioneers a new epistemic theory of aboutness-fixing for singular thought. If successful, it would capture the attractions of both descriptivist and causal theories, and it would explain the intuitive verdicts for paradigm cases of singular thought. Unfortunately, her official picture leads to either unsavoury claims about rationality or unsavoury restrictions on singular thought (§2). But there is an alternative in the vicinity. I present this in §3 and defend it from objection in §4. I hope to convince the reader that this is the most plausible theory on the market. However, the broader upshot is that there is a positive research programme here—that of clarifying in what sense singular thought is an epistemic achievement—which adds new fuel to a longstanding debate about singular thought.

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